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Q. You are sure that your statement 
represents scientific truth? 
A. I am. 
Q. On what basis? 
A. On the basis of the mathematics of 
psychohistory. 
Q. Can you prove that this mathematics 
is valid'? 
A. Only to another mathematician. 
 
 –A. Asimov, Foundation 
 
Introduction  
 
Over the past decade, ‘big data’ has been positioned as the indispensable mode of 21st century research 
across academia (Boyd and Crawford 2012; Kitchin 2014i). While many of the foundational concepts 
and techniques of the big data sciences were already well-established practices across a number of 
scientific disciplines, only recently have they been assembled into a distinct field of research claiming 
legitimacy in and of itself (Kitchin 2014i, 2014ii, Ruppert 2015, Beer 2016, Williams et al. 2017). While 
social science has a quantitative history with ‘big’ datasets dating back to before Durkheim (1897 
[2006]), the emergence of ‘big data’ and computationally-intensive social science is a contemporary 
phenomenon. As with much of the discourse surrounding big data across the board, there is a tendency 
to posit the application of ‘big data’ approaches to social science questions as a revolutionary innova-
tion in the profession, both in terms of empirical reach and in theoretical advancement. Lazer and 
Radford (2017: p20), to cite a recent example, argue that in the span of a generation we “will witness 
a transformation of sociological theory through these improvements in our ability to observe dynamic 
social systems.” Yet, as Lazer and Radford also maintain, the presence of big data research in the 
leading sociology journals is minimal, with much computational social science currently being carried 
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out not by trained social scientists, but by computer scientists. Supporting this, a sociologist engaged 
in big data research described to us a major conference on big data social science as being attended 
by around “98% computer scientists and physicists and 2% sociologists” and that attendees “weren’t 
engaging with the kinds of questions that […] sociology would engage with.” 
 
While there are, undoubtedly, a significant number of social scientists developing programs of socio-
logically-informed big data work with potential for advancing social science, computationally-derived 
claims about ‘the social’ can easily become divorced from, or more worryingly contest the legitimacy 
of traditional social science that have developed over decades: the theoretical, epistemological, and 
ontological sensibilities, as well as its ethical and political commitments. In this regard, big data social 
science has ‘revolutionary’ potential regardless of the content (or success) of its knowledge claims. Or, 
as McFarland et al (2016: pg32) put it, despite the potential for innovation, it is a legitimate concern 
that “we may be more likely to witness engineering colonize sociology and the social sciences than vice 
versa.”  A decade earlier, Savage and Burrows (2007) also pointed out that the techniques of social 
research have been incorporated into the circuits of ‘knowing capitalism’ (Thrift 2005) as much ‘social 
research’ takes place outside, and in (deliberate) ignorance of, academic social science.  
 
When Lazer and Radford (2017: p25) find that what is “[p]erhaps most exciting about big data is the 
opportunity to build a science of society”, one is left to wonder what a vast number of social scientists 
are supposed to have attempted for the past two centuries, if not such a science. Of course, the idea 
that the social sciences are ‘soft’, scientifically ‘weak’ or lack internal disciplinary integrity when com-
pared to the ‘hard’ and more ‘scientifically legitimate’ natural sciences, is not new (see, for example, 
Storer 1967; Cole, 1983; Pinar et al 2008; Holmwood, 2010), and these hierarchies are the context in 
which disciplinary prejudices might shape the future of big data applications to social science ques-
tions; minimising the role of thinking about the social vis-à-vis elevating that of computational expertise 
through ‘scientific superiority’ discourse. Commentators have even gone so far as to provocatively 
declare on the possibility for a ‘methodological genocide’, in which “violence [is] being committed 
under the guise of ‘big data’ at a methodological level that is not being discussed.”† Yet, as we suggest 
in this paper, the conditions in which the locus of legitimate interpretation for computationally-inten-
sive big data social science is being manufactured is sociologically quite different to the cases of big 
data biology and physics. This paper uses our in-depth studies of these ‘hard’ scientific fields to criti-
cally probe the question of who is currently poised to be the legitimate interpreter of big data social 
science and the implications this may have for social science research in the future. We take our 
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empirically robust analyses of biology and physics to make suggestions, provocations even, that point 
towards analyses of ‘big data’ social science that make similar use of STS-derived concepts. 
 
Like many of our colleagues, we welcome new methods of researching the social, new ways of address-
ing social science questions, but offer our use of the concept of the locus of legitimate interpretation 
in the paper as a contribution to discussions about the ways in which sociological (and other social 
science) sensibilities can be retained in big data research, as a bulwark against domination through 
technical discourse by badly-practised ‘social scientism’. 
 
Who are the legitimate interpreters of big data social science? 
 
While there is an emerging body of critical, social theory-informed big data social science (Niederer 
and Taudin Chabot 2015; Kitchin and McArdle 2016; Kitchen 2014i; Symons and Alvarado, 2016; Cock-
ayne, 2016), we propose a critical engagement from a different vantage point: Science and Technology 
Studies (STS). STS has historically dealt with its objects of study – socio-technological systems and 
research fields – with a highly critical eye, and thus offers a number of tools for probing big data 
computational social science (hereon BDCSS) futures. Additionally, a vast number of STS studies exist 
analysing the role of scientific fields where big data computation has been the dominant experimental 
paradigm. We present two cases in which the authors have extensive sociological expertise: (i) big data 
biology in the ‘–omic’ sciences, and (ii) in big data high-energy physics (HEP). Both disciplines have, 
for decades, performed big data production and analysis, but they engage computational practices, 
data analysis and data interpretation in different ways. Furthermore, both assign epistemic legitimacy 
and power differently to computational versus ‘traditional’ practices in their fields. The –omic sciences 
and HEP thus offer a primary, comparative, empirically rich point of departure for understanding the 
way in which scientific disciplines structure legitimacy of interpretation around computational prac-
tices.  
 
Our prime contribution to the debate will be to show that in contrast to sociology, where ‘analysing 
society’ is often framed by outsiders as if it were a ubiquitous expertise‡, biologists and physicists face 
few, if any, challenges to their monopoly on making legitimate knowledge claims about those aspects 
of the world encompassed by their discipline. Despite increasingly relying on computational practices 
that have demanded the introduction of new forms of expertise, the computational aspect in biology 
and physics is often subjugated as a tool, a service even, to be used by those with disciplinary grounding 
                                                 
‡ Indeed, this goes beyond mere hierarchies of disciplinary prestige and we grant that there is a minimal ‘common-sense’ 
sociological knowledge intrinsic to all individuals living in any society; all socialised individuals must have some tacit 
capacity to understand and analyse society in order to live in society. By comparison, these individuals need no such 
understanding of biology to keep their blood flowing, or physics to prevent them spinning off into space. 
 
Pre-print: Accepted for publication in Big Data and Society, 5 March 2018. 
in the sensibilities of their discipline. However, this arrangement is not unconnected to the way in 
which the big data of biology and physics is made –crafted within, and for use by, these disciplines – 
and we therefore describe the critical distinction between such ‘crafted’ and ‘found’ data in this paper. 
As our extensive empirical work on biology and physics has shown, the transformation of a discipline 
into one that produces and uses big data need not entail a revolutionary transformation in the locus 
of legitimate interpretation. However, as our observations of some big data claim-making about social 
science questions also show, big data does have the potential to erode even further the primacy of 
knowledge claims about the social made by those with groundings in disciplinary social science, and 
sociology in particular.    
 
We situate our paper in dialogue with Beer’s (2016) work on how we should study the history (and 
for us, equally the sociology) of big data. For Beer, “we need to place Big Data within the genealogy 
of social data of various types… [and]… approach this history by treating Big Data as both material 
phenomenon and also a concept” (p1). While completely agreeing with this approach, we advocate the 
value of extending beyond social data to include other comparative articulations of big data practices. 
In this paper, we show how big data in the two domains that we have studied in depth (biology and 
physics) is associated with a change in the arrangements of work that produce and analyse this data, 
the legitimation of knowledge claims, and, to some degree, the rhetoric of the underlying epistemology, 
which we use as a basis for our observations of difference in BDCSS. By considering big data as an 
enactment, pointing to the importance of how socio-material sets of practices achieve and accomplish 
big data as a meaningful phenomenon, we place big data in its social and cultural context. Of course, 
our notion of enactment does not deny the affordances and impacts of big data, nor its increasing 
popularity as a novel mode of research and powerful research tool. However, for the scientific fields 
we use to illustrate this argument, we locate ‘big data’ within a socio-material account that recognises 
not only the scientific and technical promises of big data, but also the performative capacity of the 
promises, the practices, and the specificities around big data. As Beer (2016) argues, big data as a 
concept “defines, enacts and ushers in” (p9) the materiality it describes.  
 
Fieldwork 
 
Our argument is informed by a set of empirical projects and participatory activities that ran over a 
15-year period. These include extended ethnographic contact in multiple sites of scientific work, sets 
of qualitative interviews, a survey of UK academic bioinformaticians, and the participant comprehen-
sion of working in and on big data programmes in both biology and physics. Bartlett has conducted 
postgraduate and postdoctoral research on ‘big’ biological projects, including the Human Genome 
Project (Bartlett 2008) and large-scale psychiatric genetics (Arribas-Ayllon et al 2013; Bartlett and 
Lewis, forthcoming). With Lewis he has also conducted research on the development of academic 
Pre-print: Accepted for publication in Big Data and Society, 5 March 2018. 
bioinformatics in the United Kingdom (Lewis & Bartlett 2013; Lewis et al 2016; Bartlett et al 2017). In 
addition to qualitative data, this research involved a survey examining the attitudes and opinions of 
those working in UK academic bioinformatics (Bartlett, Lewis & Williams 2016). Lewis has also con-
ducted interview and observational research with scientists working in bioinformatics and proteomics 
including those working at the European Bioinformatics Institute (Lewis 2008) and has participatory 
experience of working in research centres engaged in both big data biology and big data social science 
(Lewis 2008). Reyes-Galindo has carried out extended research in the sociology of physics, in particular 
the mediating role of computational and data analytic cultures in both ‘big’ and ‘small’ science settings. 
This included fieldwork with a computational physics group at the Conseil Européen pour la Recherche 
Nucléaire (CERN) and other physics institutes around the world, and has produced work on the role 
of algorithms in defining physics communities (Reyes-Galindo 2016). Stephens has conducted a four-
year ethnographic study of the development of biological big data tools in the novel context of cell 
culturing (Stephens, forthcoming). Collectively these form a substantial and robust body of studies 
from which our STS-based analysis of big data in practice is drawn. 
 
In what follows, we articulate four key theoretical concepts used in our analysis. We apply them to 
biology and physics in specific detail, and reflect on their relevance for big data applications to social 
science in a more general way. In doing so, we demonstrate how the histories, institutional forms, and 
power dynamics of a discipline play a part in producing different forms of big data enactment; with 
concrete empirically-grounded examples in the cases of biology and physics, and suggestions of possible 
futures and research agendas in the case of the social sciences learnt from those examples.  
 
Four key concepts: enactment, primary/secondary inscriptions, crafted/found data, and the locus of 
legitimate interpretation 
 
The classic notion of enactment in STS captures how scientific work operates to bring into being the 
knowledge-world it seeks to explore (Pickering 1995). Studies of sociology (Law and Urry 2004), eco-
nomics (Callon 1998; MacKenzie 2006), public understanding of science (Michael 2016), biology (Borup 
et al. 2006; Brown and Michael 2003), and physics (Galison 1997; Barad 2007; Pickering 1995) have 
demonstrated that research visions and methodologies are performative in the making and re-making 
of scientific disciplines and their knowledges. Here, we show how in biology and physics the notion of 
big data, its manipulation, and the institutional forms that support it, are brought into being through 
extensive physical, intellectual and symbolic labour and material configuration. Furthermore, the spe-
cific form these enactments bring with them particular socio-material relations, power dynamics, and 
implications for what form big data science takes and its efficacy as a research tool.  
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To do this, we draw upon the notion of inscriptions (Latour and Woolgar 1986), and especially primary 
and secondary inscriptions (Authors 2013). Laboratory instruments in this metaphor are seen as “in-
scription devices” that “transform a material substance into a figure or a diagram” (Latour and Woolgar 
1986: 51), or ‘nature’ into ‘knowledge’ – understood as socially legitimised, portable and stabilised 
‘facts’. In previous work examining big data biology, we distinguished between Latourian primary 
inscriptions that transform the material into the symbolic, and secondary inscriptions that are the 
result of separate, distinct transformations of the symbolic into a second set (Authors 2013; Authors 
2016; Authors 2017; Authors Forthcoming). An example from biology of producing a primary inscrip-
tion is the physical, material work of drawing blood samples, extracting the DNA, and genotyping the 
DNA on a gene chip, producing hundreds of thousands of data points. An example of producing a 
secondary inscription is taking these existing primary inscriptions and conducting Genome-Wide As-
sociation Studies (GWAS), using a dataset containing the genomic and phenotypic data of thousands 
of individuals, in order to discover associations between genetic variants and phenotypic traits§. These 
processes of secondary inscription can be conducted without ever entering a traditional laboratory, 
and produce a distinct form of representation with different standards.  
 
We extend this analysis from biology to physics and discuss the implications of this way of thinking 
for big data social science. In doing so, we develop a distinction between crafted and found data. 
‘Crafted’ data are inscriptions produced within the scientific community which will use these inscrip-
tions in order to make knowledge claims. In other words, data that have been produced with the 
disciplinary sensibilities of scientists in mind; specifically oriented, for example, towards answering 
questions that are meaningful within the discipline. ‘Found’ data, on the other hand, are inscriptions 
that ‘exist’ independently of the intent and design of the scientific community doing the analysis (for 
example, administrative or transactional data that reflects the priorities and purposes of its produc-
ers)**. Found data are ‘out there’, already existing as inscriptions, independent of any prospective or 
imagined disciplinary use and control. This paper suggests that the differences between the way in 
which big data is enacted in biology and physics, and in its application to social science questions, is 
related to the fact that the natural sciences craft their own inscriptions, while those applying data to 
social science questions often draw on existing, ‘found’ inscriptions from Twitter, Google or Amazon 
for example.  
 
                                                 
§ It is important to note that these statistical associations are not themselves ‘interpretations’. Bartlett, attending a 
psychiatric genetics workshop, observed a senior bioinformatician present the statistical associations discovered during 
their work who ended his presentation by saying that he couldn’t tell you what any of this meant biologically, and that it 
was the job of the biologists present to perform the interpretation.  This anecdote also points us towards where the locus 
of legitimate interpretation is to be found in big data biology.  
** The distinction between found and crafted data is well known within qualitative social science, though not always 
articulated in these terms. For example, in diary analysis, crafted diary data would involve asking (perhaps even training) 
participants to complete a diary of their experiences as part of the research (see Alaszewski et al. 2007) whereas found 
diary data would be analysis of diary entries the participants created independently of the research (see Coffey 2014). 
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The notion of the locus of legitimate interpretation originates in the work of Collins and Evans (2007: 
120). It describes the (social) ‘location’, in terms of communities and expertise, from which legitimate 
knowledge claims and judgements of those knowledge claims can be made.  To illustrate, we can think 
briefly about where we would find the locus of legitimate interpretation in two starkly different cases. 
Collins and Evans argue that the locus of legitimate interpretation for art extends beyond the commu-
nity of art-producers. Audiences and art critics are treated as legitimate assessors of the quality of the 
work. By comparison, in the sciences, the locus of legitimate interpretation usually lies well inside the 
community of producers, as only those with specialist expertise are deemed sufficiently equipped to 
make valid judgements. When deploying this analytical framework it is important to keep distinct its 
descriptive application – documenting empirically who holds legitimacy within a specific context – 
and its normative application – arguing that particular groups ought to be deemed legitimate inter-
preters. In this paper we do both; by drawing on our empirical sociologies of biology and physics to 
describe the locus of legitimate interpretation in these cases, and by raising questions about where 
and how the locus of legitimate is to be found in questions of BDCSS 
 
Describing this in terms of inscriptions and crafted/found data, we argue that in -omic biology and 
HEP physics, both primary and secondary inscriptions are crafted, analysed, and interpreted within 
the established scientific communities. By contrast, an emerging paradigm in big data applications to 
social questions is to create secondary inscriptions from data found outside the discipline. Further, it 
is possible to make ‘social’ knowledge claims using big data, which are taken to be legitimate, from 
outside of the disciplinary cultures of social science. In other words, the ‘location’ of the making, 
analysis, and interpretation of big social data, and the judgement on these knowledge claims allows us 
to say that the locus of legitimate interpretation is much more widely distributed in the social sciences 
than is the case in biology and physics. 
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Enacting big data in biology  
 
Big data underwent its foundational enactment as a scientific and political force in biology during the 
period of 1990-2003 with the Human Genome Project (HGP). The HGP remains the biggest biological 
collaboration in history (Tripp and Grueber 2011; Hilgartner 2013). It provided the technological and 
informational platform, as well as the inspiration and model, for the post-HGP data-driven sciences 
(Collins et al. 2003), such as genomics, proteomics, transcriptomics, and metabolomics, collectively 
known as the ‘–omic’ sciences. In the post-HGP-era, techniques for producing significant amounts of 
data have meant that both the production and analysis of big biological data have become available to 
smaller and smaller research groups (Grada and Weinbrecht 2013; Check Hayden 2014). The establish-
ment of biology as, at least in part, an informational, computational science, has been accompanied by 
claims that this new way of doing biology is data-driven (Stevens, 2013; Leonelli, 2016), and even 
(perhaps erroneously) ‘hypothesis-free’ (Cooke Bailey, Pericak-Vance and Haines 2014)††. 
 
Biologists, Bioinformatics and Bioinformaticians 
 
While bioinformatics has a history almost as long as the history of computing itself (Strasser 2010, 
Suarez-Diaz 2010; Garcia-Sancho 2012; November 2012), the HGP was the catalyst for its rapid growth 
and disciplinary infrastructure of conferences, journals, grants, and undergraduate and postgraduate 
courses’ (Authors 1 and 2 2016; Stevens, 2013). The move to enacting big data brought with it a 
requirement for a formalisation of mathematical and computer literacy through -omic-oriented bioin-
formatics (Authors 2013; Authors 2016). This collective enterprise encompasses a broad set of actors 
including data curators, data analysts, and computer engineers that seek to align computational anal-
ysis with large data sets (Harvey and McMeekin 2002). However, bioinformatics – like any other field 
– is itself a distinct and recognisable community and set of practices (Bartlett et al 2017). In the 
theoretical language developed here, bioinformatics is the work of producing secondary inscriptions 
through the application of computational techniques to the primary inscriptions made in the labora-
tory. That is, the data is crafted by the biologist and their contact with the material, biological world 
– be that a cell line, a living organism, or a survey of people - and is then further transformed by a 
process of secondary inscription by a bioinformatician.  
 
The status of bioinformatics is contested within the reward and recognition structures of biology. This 
is clear in the contrast between Stein’s (2008) celebrative account of the total integration of compu-
tational methods into biology in the statement “[b]iologists are all bioinformaticians now” (p151) with 
                                                 
†† Anderson (2006) boldly announced that the advent of the ‘Petabyte Age’ rendered theory and the scientific method 
‘obsolete’. As with many commentators, he talked of ‘big data’ in the language of a natural event – in this case as a ‘deluge’. 
Franks (2012), for example, steps up the level of destruction (disruption?) and describes it as a ‘tidal wave’, while Stiemle 
(2015) warns of us ‘drowning in big data’ 
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Chang’s (2015: 151) pessimistic claims that “there are not enough bioinformaticians” and that “[b]io-
logical data will continue to pile up unless those who analyse them are recognized as creative collab-
orators in need of career paths” (see also Bartlett et al 2016, Bartlett et al 2017). In our own work, we 
refer to contestation over the institutional position of computational analysis in biology as the ‘mid-
dling’ of bioinformatics (Lewis et al 2016), bridging the gap between computer science and biology 
but as yet not forming its own, coherent, disciplinary space, nor occupying those of its ‘parental’ 
disciplines‡‡. Although conceptually central to the doing of post-genomic science, bioinformatics is 
institutionally peripheral, and is often positioned by biologists as a service to biology, (Lewis & Bartlett 
2013; Authors 2017), blending into the background (Baren-Nawrocka 2013). In many cases, despite the 
rhetoric, we have found that data analysis and computation is not a particularly highly valued or 
rewarded activity within biology (Lewis et al 2016).  
 
It should be noted here that much computing expertise is brought into biology from outside the 
discipline. Bioinformatics is often blackboxed as far as many biologists are concerned – with analysis 
being conducted by collaborating bioinformaticians, often at a distance (even if they are within the 
same institution) – or through the use of standardised bioinformatics tools (Lewis & Bartlett 2013). 
Some in the field see this as a positive, while others recognise the problems of this ‘collaborative or 
collective interdisciplinarity’ (see Calvert 2010; Lewis & Bartlett 2013). For example, while the compu-
tational work is performed by bioinformaticians, the burden of analysis is shared with biologists, who 
through the disciplinary and institutional systems of prestige, retain a dominant position with regard 
to the locus of legitimate interpretation. Importantly, biologists have institutional ‘ownership’ of the 
data of big data biology. 
 
There are instances in which ‘big biology’ produces big data – the case of the HGP, for example. Here, 
bioinformatics can be conducted in large-scale settings, such as the National Centre for Biotechnology 
Information (NCBI) in the USA, the DNA Data Bank of Japan (DDBJ) and the European Bioinformatics 
Institute (EBI). But big data also produces big science. We observe this not only in the epistemic 
demands for big data to tackle genetically and phenotypically complex disorders, but also in that the 
resulting big data (and the techniques and technologies developed in these projects) enables (scientif-
ically, institutionally, and ‘politically’) further big science projects. This is clear in the way in which the 
accomplishment and legacy of the HGP has helped shape many other satellite centres of post-HGP -
omic science. The scale of bioinformatics projects therefore can also be much smaller, sometimes 
involving only a handful of researchers. Such smaller science big data work often draws on computa-
tional and statistical expertise from a centralised group within their host institution (Authors 1&2 
forthcoming). Many universities establish a central bioinformatics hub for its researchers to work with 
                                                 
‡‡ It is important to recognise that we are making a distinction here between bioinformatics as a recognisable community 
and bioinformatics as a legitimate discipline that exists independently of biology. 
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when they see fit. Yet these smaller science settings may still rely on components of big science, by 
drawing upon the training, data, applications, and collaborative skills of institutions such as the EBI. 
Furthermore, the work of these smaller science big data projects can be aggregated using standardised 
protocols for data collection and recording (Wallis et al. 2013). This is already underway in the ‘-omic 
sciences’ (Harvey and McMeekin 2010; Leonelli 2012; Leonelli 2013), and is spreading to other areas of 
biological research such as cell culturing (Khan et al. 2014). Reflecting this, big biological data science 
is promised as being geography-free, as collation disentangles it from the peculiarities and particular-
ities of localised settings, with global infrastructures allowing seemingly ‘frictionless’ international flow.  
 
The epistemic culture (Knorr-Cetina 1999) of biology has shifted in the post-HGP era. Some argue 
this is a move from ‘hypothesis-driven’ research into an era of ‘hypothesis-free’ biology (Cooke Bailey, 
Pericak-Vance and Haines 2014), although, perhaps more accurately, the move to data driven biology 
is a change from deductive to inductive reasoning (Leonelli 2012). This change has already been insti-
tutionalised and embedded within the distinctive nomenclature of the ‘-omic’ sciences. An important 
point must be reiterated with regard to this new, inductive, mode; big data biology ‘crafts’ its data. 
The vast databases of -omic data that are said to ‘drive’ much contemporary biology have been crafted 
in a laboratory, by technicians and scientists trained in biological ways of thinking and according to 
the disciplinary sensibilities of biologists. Even when computational biologists come to use these large 
data sets at one step removed, having played no part in the production of the data, the data that they 
use are still crafted within the epistemic culture of biology.     
 
The locus of legitimate interpretation for big data biology is located firmly within the epistemic, 
disciplinary culture of biology: data are produced within the discipline, in laboratories, by biologists, 
or by computer scientists with biological sensibilities in mind. That is, although computational and 
statistical expertise has been drawn into the discipline, bringing with it a new style of statistical 
reasoning (Leonelli 2012, Lewis and Bartlett forthcoming), it has been done so in a way that positions 
it subordinate to the disciplinary concerns of biology (Lewis and Bartlett 2013). We now turn our 
attention to big data in physics. 
 
Enacting big data in physics 
 
Historical and ethnomethodological studies identify three families of practice in physics: theory, phe-
nomenology, and experiment. Phenomenology encompasses the cumulus of disciplines that does the 
bulk of the ‘translation’ between theory and experiment (Galison 1997; Merz and Knorr-Cetina 1997; 
Reyes-Galindo 2011). Specifically, Reyes-Galindo (2014) describes physics as being structured around 
two opposite poles of practices: theoretical and experimental, but with many intermediate micro-
cultures mediating the transmission of knowledge across them. In all these micro-cultures, computation 
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has for a long time been an important element, particularly in High Energy Physics (HEP) experiments, 
which are nowadays recognised as forerunners of big data science (Murray 2014). Yet it is only recently, 
with the rise of ‘big data’ rhetoric in the media and in commercial and academic discourse, that 
physicists have begun to market their traditional practices as ‘big data’. Indeed, the first occurrences 
of the term ‘big data’ in the physics arXiv preprint server – the single most important resource for 
vanguard physics – are as recent as 2013 (Anderson et al. 2013), while the earliest mentions of ‘big 
data’ related to physics in the scientific press refer not to a discourse on the promises or possibilities 
of big data, but to the problems of sustainable and reliable computational infrastructure that big data 
sets imply (Lynch 2008). 
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The locus of legitimate interpretation in HEP 
 
Nowhere in physics has the rapid accumulation of vast amounts of data been more visible than in 
HEP, as experiments have increasingly demanded more data-points to reach the confidence levels 
required by physicists to claim that a ‘finding’ is in fact a ‘discovery’ (5 standard deviations are the 
norm in HEP). The paradigmatic case of big data in physics is CERN and the Large Hadron Collider 
(LHC) experiments (Kriege 1996; Knorr-Cetina 1999), though other projects such as the Sloan Digital 
Sky Survey and other sky-mapping experiments in astronomy and astrophysics also produce terabytes 
of analysable data (Zhang and Zhao 2015). For example, one of the core CERN experiments, CMS 
(Compact Muon Solenoid), produces around 1 petabyte (100 gigabytes) of ‘raw’ data per second, and 
there are similar figures for the other experiments. The quantities of data produced are only expected 
to increase, although CERN currently only stores in the order of 35 petabytes a year as the overwhelm-
ing majority is filtered out. Yet a modern physics experiment does not necessarily require the size and 
complexity of CERN to reach the data-acquisition numbers of CERN. The smaller-scale, Mexico-based 
High-Altitude Water Cherenkov Observatory (HAWC) international collaboration generates about 1 
terabyte of data per day, just under the same order of magnitude as the data produced at CERN, but 
– unlike CERN – records all data for possible later analyses (Gitler and Klapp 2016). 
 
In big physics settings such as CERN, which involves work in a number of highly specialised areas, the 
multiple loci of legitimate interpretation are found in the collectively-vetted effort. Locating these is 
somewhat more complex than the situations captured by Collins and Evans’ (2007) portrayal of inter-
expertise dialogue and meta-expertise interdisciplinary management, as the multiple expertises in 
CERN often overlap and become too complicated for a single actor to fully comprehend. Despite the 
detectors being physically grouped at two sister sites near Geneva and there being a known set of core 
group leaders, CERN is a globally-distributed knowledge-producing network in which the acquisition, 
handling and processing, and interpretation of the data is carried out by several independent commu-
nities within ‘the experiment’. The data is cleaned even as it is being acquired, recorded, and then 
interpreted and re-interpreted in several steps in which interpretative legitimacy is ‘lent’ to the expert 
groups that intervene in each step. Once all the steps come together, a final stable consensus is reached 
after a long gruelling process of micro-data crafting, for example, when a ‘discovery paper’ is published 
in collaborative authorship. The importance of each parallel interpretational mesh-point and the local-
ity of each step is made most obvious by the number of authors in contemporary discovery ‘megapa-
pers’ – the Physics Letter B paper announcing the discovery of the Higgs boson was signed as ‘CMS 
collaboration’ and ‘ATLAS collaboration’ and jointly included more than 6,000 authors. As a senior 
computational physicist remarked in interview: 
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“Nowadays even building the detectors has become an industrial enterprise. In the past, a 
group or a small set of groups was responsible for designing, building, operating the whole 
detector, the calorimeter, the vertex detector, particle identification detector […] Nowadays, 
each detector is an enterprise of many institutes, many people, so you don’t even get the 
overview of the whole detector.” 
 
Though distributed among the collaboration teams, the locus of legitimate interpretation remains 
within ‘the experiment’ as a whole; that is, within the CERN community. The distributed interpretation 
makes it impossible for a single member of the collaboration to draw away into a personal interpre-
tation of the entire experimental setup, as Delfanti (2016) has described in his discussion of deliberative 
democracy methods for producing authorship in HEP. Once the ‘results’ have been stabilised within 
each interpretative step in a multiplicity of primary inscriptions, they are then collectively cohered into 
project-overarching secondary inscriptions which are then put into collected tables of ‘definitive’ data, 
such as the massive Review of Particle Physics (RPP) published by the Particle Data Group at the 
Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory.  
 
Bibliometric investigations (Basaglia et al. 2008) and fieldwork at CERN by Reyes-Galindo suggest that, 
as described by Bartlett & Lewis (2013) in bioinformatics, computational physics is generally regarded 
as a less prestigious activity than other areas of research, despite its importance for the generation of 
experimental outcomes. That programming and computation in scientific settings – and specifically in 
physics – is, broadly speaking, regarded as “production rather than research” (Slayton 2013:38) and is 
known to be a feature not just of scientific computing but of the whole field of programming 
(Ensmenger 2012). It is therefore unsurprising that the critical component of data analysis at CERN, 
infrastructure computing, is generally looked down upon as ‘technical’ and ‘service’ work and is per-
ceived as an activity at some remove from the prestige of ‘real’ research. 
 
Low-level data reconstruction, though seen as being closer to ‘research’ and requiring significantly 
more specialised knowledge of physics, is still seen as being less prestigious than other research prac-
tices such as hardware development. This work – save for a few individuals who are considered the 
leading experts of their fields – is the domain of the graduate students and postdoctoral researchers 
who do most of the grunt work. Nevertheless, informants in Reyes-Galindo’s empirical research de-
scribed the way in which reconstruction is divided into many subspecialties. Each of these require 
intensive specialisation that is often experiment-specific. Between these specialities hierarchies have 
formed, though in general reconstruction work is of lesser status to that of conducting ‘original’ 
research. Speaking of the status of computational work, a senior computational physicist at CERN 
reflected that:  
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“you’re not a technician because you still have a degree in physics, often a PhD anyway, but 
nevertheless you are not doing the bulk of the attraction of the field… [computational work] 
is not itself, you know, the most attractive topic to talk about.” 
 
In other words, computational physics is not only subordinate to other modes of physical thinking, it 
is a dispreferred way of working and thinking when compared to those which attracted physicists to 
the field in the first place.  The production of primary inscriptions at CERN (the local experimental 
groups, e.g. CMS, ATLAS) and the interpretation (not production) of secondary inscriptions (over-
arching high-level analysis) are the most esteemed and desirable ‘scientific’ work, valued far above the 
‘technical’ domain of primary inscription analysis (both general and experiment-specific IT services). 
Data are crafted according to the sensibilities of physicists, and much of the computational and sta-
tistical expertise is found within the discipline. Yet all these practices are arranged within the experi-
mental organization. Through the coordination of all these local practices, modern HEP crafts its own 
data and keeps the locus of legitimation interpretation firmly inside the scientific community. For all 
their differences in epistemic culture, -omic biology and HEP demonstrate important similarities in 
the way in which they have incorporated ‘big data’. 
 
Thoughts on the social sciences, computational social science, and the Locus of Legitimate Interpreta-
tion  
 
So far in this paper we have analysed the ways in which data are crafted within big biology and big 
physics, and which communities and bodies of expertise are deemed to be the legitimate interpreters 
of that data. In this section, we make some observations about the way in which the application of big 
data to social science questions can be enacted in a fundamentally different way to the examples 
provided by the ‘harder’ sciences. In the social sciences, big data can exist independent of the labours 
of social scientists, described in this paper as ‘found’. This is often posited as one of the epistemic 
strengths of big data social science, despite the assumptions that must be made about data found 
outside the discipline, regarding, for example, the comprehensiveness and representativeness of online 
populations, etc. (Lazer and Radford 2017). This is a fundamental epistemic difference between the 
social and the natural sciences with regard to the relationship between the ‘scientist’ and her ‘data’. 
For the most part, only physicists and biologists are legitimate interpreters of big data produced in 
physics and biology; the locus of legitimate interpretation is firmly within the disciplinary community. 
However, the ability to make a knowledge claim about the social that is treated as credible is afforded 
to a much wider spread of people. As we discussed in the opening sections, the locus of legitimate 
interpretation in big data applications to social science questions is much more diffuse. Thus, the 
organisational and epistemic model of big data science that we find in the natural sciences does not 
find a direct reflection in big data social science.  
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In this section, we provide some clear examples of the way in which big data applications to social 
science questions can be performed outside of established social science communities. It is important 
to stress that these examples are not used to suggest that they are representative of BDCSS as a whole. 
While we have conducted extensive sociological research on physics and biology, as yet we have no 
solid research program to this end. Rather, these examples are intended to serve as illustrations of the 
way in which big data can be performed and scientifically positioned as ‘legitimate’ social science. This 
is crucial because, as we show in our final discussions, recent studies in the sociology of physics have 
shown that analysis of physics ‘data’ performed outside of the traditionally-constituted locus of legiti-
mate interpretation is overwhelmingly rejected as ‘crackpot science’ (Collins et al. 2017). This is true 
even if the knowledge claims that are being produced are the technically-savvy products of people 
with significant expertise in physics or related disciplines. Knowledge claims produced by outsiders 
are almost never considered legitimate by the physics community, and are often portrayed as the 
antithesis of ‘good’ physics. The boundaries of physics set by physicists match very closely the bound-
aries of good physics as seen by funders, policy makers, science journalists, etc. The examples in this 
section show that, in the case of ‘social’ questions, the locus of legitimate interpretation is ‘diffused’, 
extending outside the established, disciplinary social sciences. 
 
We start with a Nature special feature article (Giles 2012) which described the status of ‘computational 
social sciences’ research. This article discussed several examples, such as the research carried out by 
Liben-Nowell and Kleinberg (2007) which supported existing social science claims about social net-
works, as well as that challenged established social science views (Ugander et al. 2012). Critically, all 
the studies mentioned in the feature were carried out not by social scientists but by computer scien-
tists. Kleinman is quoted describing how he “…realized that computer science is not just about tech-
nology”, but rather “[i]t is also a human topic” (Giles 2012: 448). Kleinberg also adds how he thinks 
of himself “as a computer scientist who is interested in social questions” (Giles 2012: 450). Nowhere 
in the feature is the absence of social science knowledge and expertise portrayed negatively, except 
possibly in terms of way in which these researchers are not tied into addressing questions that are 
interesting to those working in established fields of social research. It is, according to this view in 
Nature, scientifically legitimate for a computer scientist to conduct research into ‘social phenomena’ 
despite having, in the best cases, low-level working knowledge of social phenomena, traditional social 
science methods and social science theory. 
 
To make the above asymmetry clearer, we next turn to another Nature feature by the same author 
that discussed the opposite case, that of social scientist claiming to be a legitimate interlocutor about 
(not in) a natural science field. Giles (2006:8) describes how sociologist Harry Collins had to prove, 
through an incredibly difficult ‘imitation game’ test judged by a panel of gravitational wave physicists, 
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that through thirty years’ experience interacting directly with the gravitational waves community he 
had acquired sufficient ‘interactional expertise’ to meaningfully and legitimately speak the language of 
gravitational waves (Collins et al. 2006). As Giles comments, Collins’ point about legitimacy was one 
of the most strongly contested positions of the 1990s ‘Science Wars’ in which some natural scientists 
were angered by the fact that “sociologists studying science did not understand the disciplines involved, 
in part because they did not practice them” (Giles 2006: 8). In fact, the asymmetry is even more 
extreme when we realise that the Science Wars criticism of social science legitimacy was not about 
social scientists practising natural science (which no sociologist of science would claim to do), but 
indeed only on talking about the natural sciences. 
 
While some in computational social science stress the revolutionary aspects of their work, others 
pursue the research agenda without exclamation on its novelty, rending it normal and uncontroversial. 
Such work includes people–centric sensing and social sensing to track physical sensors in mobile 
devices to “learn about (possibly hidden) social structures” (Campbell et al. 2008: 20) and “infer social 
relationships” (Krishnamurthy and Poor 2014: 3). In the latter, interaction through social media posts 
are analysed to produce models that “facilitate understanding the dynamics of information flow in 
social networks and, therefore, the design of algorithms that can exploit these dynamics to estimate 
the underlying state of nature” (Krishnamurthy and Poor 2014: 3). As the authors explain, the “moti-
vation for th[eir] paper stems from understanding how individuals interact in a social network and 
how simple local behavior can result in complex global behavior.” They defend their methodology by 
pointing out that “[t]he underlying tools used in this paper are widely used by the electrical engineering 
research community in the areas of signal processing, control, information theory, and network com-
munications” (Krishnamurthy and Poor 2014: 19).  Similar analytical forms have been applied to stud-
ying emergency events (Xu et al. 2016), online rumour detection (Liu and Xu 2016), and appreciation 
of cultural heritage (Pilato and Maniscalco 2015). Often connected in some way to the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, these publications operate in the space where computer science, 
social media, and social analysis overlap, yet they are conducted largely in isolation of the traditional 
knowledge and expertise bases of social science. 
 
The differences between the enactment and positioning of big data in the social and the natural science 
are also clear in the work of another computer scientist featured in the Nature article - Alex Pentland 
– and his fascinating (and revealingly titled) book Social Physics (Pentland 2014). Here, ‘found’ big 
social data is described as “the millions of digital bread crumbs people leave behind via smartphones, 
GPS devices, and the Internet” (px). To put it in the terms offered by Latour and Woolgar (1986), the 
primary inscriptions that constitute big social data are ‘written’ independent of academic big social 
data practices. Social Physics, and other recent pop-social science books (such as Stephens-Davidowitz’s 
Everybody Lies), promise a new and revolutionary social science, in which society is understood in 
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terms of relationships between and within data written by our interaction with, among other things, 
the digital economy, and in which knowledge claims about society are made by experts in data analysis, 
with the sensibilities of social science largely irrelevant in the face of the new data-rich world. In this, 
we hear echoes of the rhetoric of ‘hypothesis free’ science that big data has brought to biology (Cooke 
Bailey, Pericak-Vance and Haines, 2014). This view was similarly put forward in an academic review-
cum-manifesto for computational social science in which, it is concluded that through computational 
social science “sociology in particular, and the social sciences in general, would undergo a dramatic 
paradigm shift, arising from the incorporation of the scientific method of physical sciences” (Conte et 
al. 2012).  Indeed, Pentland’s vision (exciting though it is) for a ‘social science’ of studying information 
exchange without knowledge of the content or meaning is indeed a radical (and revolutionary) depar-
ture from the intellectual mission of much of 20th century social science – that which aims for the 
kind of comprehension of human socialities that can be gained by slower, craft-orientated methods 
such as ethnography§§. 
 
Will such a ‘new discipline’ be “an example of statistics-led research with no theoretical underpinning”? 
This is how Professor Susan McVie, professor of quantitative criminology at the University of Edin-
burgh, responded to the publicity surrounding a recent paper uploaded to the most important ‘hard’ 
science e-print server, the arXiv (BBC 2016, Wu and Zhang 2016). This paper claimed that, using 
supervised machine learning, the authors – who work in an Electrical Engineering department*** – had 
developed a system for distinguishing criminals from non-criminals (or as the authors label them, 
‘normal people’), with criminals successfully identified 89% of the time. McVie is quoted by the BBC 
as stressing the various biases involved in producing a criminal conviction – the ‘found data’ used by 
Wu and Zhang – pointing out that “[t]his article is not looking at people's behaviour, it is looking at 
criminal conviction”. Using the vocabulary proposed here, McVie is not only highlighting the weakness 
of naïvely found data, but is demanding that the locus of legitimate interpretation of ‘big data crimi-
nology’ remains within criminology, a community able to draw on decades of collective knowledge of 
dealing with crime statistics, as well as understanding the biases and cultural differences in criminal 
justice systems, etc†††.  Surprisingly, McVie’s view did not find support from prestigious voices in 
‘harder’ fields of science and technology. Quite the contrary. The MIT Technology Review, for example, 
though acknowledging the study as “controversial”, supported Wu and Zhang by noting that their 
work was consistent with a previous 2011 psychological experiment from Cornell University (Emerging 
Technology from the arXiv 2016). We stress that we are not, per se, against the new possibilities 
afforded by computational social science, but rather worried by computational exercises such as Wu 
                                                 
§§ There has been some excitement about a future social science that moves beyond ‘outmoded’ methods devised for 20th 
century societies, unfit for new, 21st century forms of sociality (see, for a starting point, Savage and Burrows 2007). 
*** Curiously, electrical engineers are well represented in ‘fringe’ physics communities (Authors 1 & 3 2017). 
††† In contrast to Wu and Zhang’s theoretically light work, Williams et al. (2017) conducted an ESRC funded big data 
study using classic criminological theory to inform the collection, transformation, classification and modelling of over 200 
million tweets to identify their affordances and limitations in relation to crime pattern  estimation. 
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and Zhang’s study that rely on the rhetorical weight of big data to convey epistemological strength on 
its own. It is telling of the state of things that even critical (yet optimist) views on the impact of 
computational social sciences on traditional social sciences call for social scientists to “embrace Big 
Data” (González-Bailón 2013), while computational experts dealing with social phenomena are rarely 
called to conversely embrace traditional sociological tradition or thought in their research. 
 
Wu and Zhang did not engage with existing criminological research yet their claims to a contribution 
to criminology were treated seriously. Their example, egregious though it is, shows how the naïveté of 
a ‘hypothesis-free social analysis’ can mutate into a pathological form in which knowledge claims are 
produced which turn back decades of careful empirical, conceptual, and ethical work. Other recent 
research, such as facial recognition of ‘sexual orientation’ through deep-learning algorithms (Wang and 
Kosinsky 2017) also work against the grain of informed reflections on stigmatised populations and 
reveals the intricate problems linked to disciplinary-uninformed interpretations of ‘social’ big data. 
There is therefore a problem beyond mere epistemological or methodological quibbling in using ‘found’ 
data without sociological insight. Pentland’s Social Physics is subtitled ‘lessons from a new science’, 
and this is perhaps exactly the point. While biology and physics are, to a greater or lesser degree, 
enacting ‘big data’ by absorbing a new way of looking at the objects of their disciplinary gaze into the 
body of their disciplines, the locus of legitimate interpretation of claims about ‘the social’ is so broad 
that big data social science can be enacted outside traditional social science disciplinary boundaries, 
even when it is conducted inside academic institutions, and afforded public legitimacy without much 
say by social scientists. While we hope, like optimistic social scientists such as Smith (2014), that in a 
‘big data social science’ sociologists will be required to interpret (and critique) the outputs, we worry 
that the cultural legitimacy of such demands appears to be weaker than might be needed in order to 
make this so. 
 
Discussion 
 
The enactment of big data can tell us something about the differences between disciplines and between 
epistemic cultures, especially by concentrating on such notions as ‘crafted’ and ‘found’ data and the 
‘locus of legitimate interpretation’. We have presented two disciplinary case studies on big data epis-
temic cultures, illustrated their relationships to crafted and found data, and shown how each disci-
plines’ locus of legitimate interpretation is structured and connected to the cultures of primary/sec-
ondary data producers and interpreters in each field. Physics, with a long tradition of dealing with big 
data, ‘produces’ its own computer scientists, and ‘big data’ physics is, mostly, conducted within the 
disciplinary space of ‘physics’. In other words, the way in which big data has been enacted in response 
to, and in sensitivity to, the disciplinary needs and priorities of physics.   
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As described, big data biology, a more recent development than big data physics, has had to recruit 
expertise from outside the discipline. Even though there are claims made that big data biology is a 
revolutionary new form of hypothesis-free science, the locus of legitimate interpretation still remains 
firmly within biology. Expertise in data analysis alone is not deemed sufficient to make legitimate 
biological knowledge claims. Biologists, as the creators of the primary inscriptions and the holders of 
cultural and institutional power, are the legitimate interpreters of big data biology, with the computer 
scientists/bioinformaticians who produce the ‘secondary inscriptions’ being dependent on, and defer-
ring to, biologists. Bioinformatics may be an offshoot of biology, but it is tied inextricably to the 
disciplinary culture and institutions of biology. Both of these natural sciences enact big data science 
in a significantly different way to that in which it is being enacted in the social sciences.  
 
Unlike the biologists and physicists, social scientists in many cases do not to have disciplinary control 
over the production of the data that they will use – it is not crafted but is, instead, found. As such, 
social scientists can make no claims of exclusivity or control over this data; anyone with the computa-
tional skills can conduct an analysis of social media, and as Metzler et al. (2016) suggest, it is rare that 
social scientists have the required computational skills. So, as with biology, in order to enact big data 
science, social science must recruit computational and statistical expertise. However, given that social 
scientists are not (always) the crafters of big social data, leaving none of their sensibilities written into 
these inscriptions. Further, claims that big data allows an atheoretical, hypothesis-free analysis of the 
social gain traction due to the low esteem in which much social science is held. The consequence of 
this is that the locus of legitimate interpretation is not firmly fixed within the communities trained in 
the social sciences. Anyone can make an acceptably credible knowledge claim, whether by virtue of 
controlling (access to) the primary inscriptions – as is the case with proprietary data – or on the basis 
of bring to bear the tools and perspectives of ‘harder’ disciplines.  
 
Kate Metzler (2016) quotes Clive Humby, the man responsible for Tesco’s Clubcard scheme, as saying 
as long as a decade ago that ‘data is the new oil’. In this account, it is not just a resource, but the 
resource of the 21st century, and those who control the data will have tremendous economic, social, 
and political power (Boyd and Crawford, 2012). Even as the ‘found’ character of much big social data 
renders some questions tractable and others unaskable, data grants power to those asking social ques-
tions working with and within the organisations – often private – which hold the data (Beer 2016). 
Metzler et al.’s (2016) survey of big data research in the social sciences found that, out of 3077 
respondents involved in big data research, just over half (1690) had most recently used administrative 
data, 927 used social media data, and 697 used commercial/propriety data. In current BDCSS practice, 
both the locus of legitimate interpretation and the ownership and control of data can lie outside the 
boundaries of social science as social scientists wrestle with others over control of empirical materials 
and the right to analyse it. 
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This contrasts sharply with physics. Bartlett and Reyes-Galindo have carried out extensive empirical 
analysis regarding the legitimacy of physics claims made by scientists who are not professional, prac-
tising physicists (Collins et al 2017). This physics ‘boundary work’ (Gieryn 1983) has shed light on the 
sociological structures of so-called ‘fringe’ or unorthodox physics and, importantly, to the relationships 
between producers of physics’ primary inscriptions and outsiders to the physics community. What is 
observed is that, in physics, the legitimacy of primary and secondary inscription production is highly 
closed in itself: those that produce primary inscriptions belong to the same social group (or network) 
as those that produce secondary inscriptions, and the legitimacy of interpreting the top most results 
legitimately is based on belonging to these social networks, not on personal characteristics or specific 
skills.  
 
There are cases in which ‘outsiders’ to these closed networks attempt to create alternative readings of 
established physics, such as when mathematically-informed engineers (and particularly electrical engi-
neers) re-evaluate recognised theoretical claims or experimental results. The ‘exclusion boundary work’ 
that follows is the same across all the fields of physics explored. Outsiders are ignored when they are 
not scientists, isolated when they are practising scientists, and in the more extreme cases ridiculed and 
declared ‘cranks’ or ‘crackpots’ by the scientific community (Reyes-Galindo 2016). Compare this to the 
response to a criminology paper produced by electrical engineers; ‘social physics’ and hypothesis-free 
big data social science have developed into legitimate areas that are autonomous and authoritative 
despite their revolutionary intent. The locus of legitimate interpretation in physics presents strong 
social closure, while in social science it is considerably more open.  
 
Thus, while in physics outsiders who attempt to overturn established knowledge claims or methods 
are de-legitimised because of their status as an outsider, a significant part of (for example) ‘social 
physics’ legitimacy-talk hinges on the strengths of being an outsider. By contrast, the physics commu-
nity would and does act swiftly in cases where not only individual knowledge claims but also its 
professional legitimacy is contested.  
 
With reference to our normative (rather than descriptive) application of the concept of the ‘locus of 
legitimate interpretation’, we draw attention to what might be the consequences of the differences 
between the tightly bounded locus of legitimate interpretation found in biology and physics, and the 
much more diffuse, contested locus found in the social sciences. The Wu and Zhang episode suggests 
that an extreme flexibility of the locus of legitimate interpretation can lead to ‘pathological’ data-driven 
social science that can, importantly, be taken seriously. Sensitivity to the pathological dimensions of 
this kind of work is not necessarily found outside of the social sciences – that is, those with the 
technical expertise required to make expert judgements. Furthermore, one can easily think of research 
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(involving stigmatised populations and minorities, race and gender relations etc.) in which theoretically 
and ethically uninformed data-driven social science could have quite profoundly negative wider im-
pacts, if given legitimacy. At the very least, critical accounts of big data sociology are required to 
counterbalance the data-driven hype. Social scientists should not be shy of performing their own 
boundary work.  
 
While big data-driven social science has presented itself as immensely disruptive to existing research, 
and certainly introduces new tools, methods and possibilities to probe societies and cultures, our 
research resonates with previous discussions about the importance of examining big data claims with 
greater scrutiny and clarity (Beer 2016). We resist the picture that the future of social science is made 
up exclusively of big data-given research, even while acknowledging that big data sociology can become 
a parallel field of research to ‘traditional’ sociology. However, we do argue there is a key issue for 
social science in terms of retaining and monitoring control over which collectives and individuals 
constitute the locus of legitimate interpretation in BDCSS. Unlike physics, this has been complicated 
for social science due to the lack of substantive base in computational mathematical methodologies, 
and unlike both physics and biology, because of the relative intellectual prestige of social science at 
the ‘softer’ end of the disciplines. This paper has argued that STS provides the basis for important 
critique of big data science. Following Eyal (2013), there is a question of jurisdiction as to who has 
control over a set of tasks and who are the legitimate interpreters of the findings.  There is also a 
question as to what social and institutional arrangements need to be in place for that authority to be 
maintained, and in what situations it can be challenged. Developments in computation and access to 
large data sets (as well as pre-existing hierarchies) have meant that sociologists and other social science 
face challenges to be the legitimate interpreters of social data in ways that biologists and physicists do 
not. 
 
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-
for-profit sectors. The authors are grateful for the previous early-career support of the ESRC and 
the British Academy. 
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